Running Scared

AG John Jeremie refused to subject himself to cross-examination, whilst two main players were said to be “out of the country,” and hence unavailable, despite the fact that it was clear they would need to be cross-examined by the CJ’s lawyers. The AG claimed there was no evidence of any misconduct or conspiracy to implicate him.

Today, I wish to extract certain passages from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Basdeo Panday case, so that people can judge whether these gentlemen were simply running scared, for fear their stories could be discredited. This is what the court, comprising appeal judges Warner, Archie and May-Weekes, had to say:

1. In his release, the Attorney General reported that the Chief Magistrate had informed him of the cheque “out of an abundance of caution, given the importance of the judgment he was about to deliver” [my emphasis] and that he (the Attorney General) had determined that he should take no action until judgment had been delivered.

   Immediately after the judgment, he made enquiries into the matter, including contacting all the parties.

   He ultimately formed the view that there was no cause for further action in the matter of the land transaction at that time, and so advised the DPP, the Commissioner of Police and the Chairman of the Integrity Commission. The complaint about the Chief Justice was still being investigated.  

2. The Attorney General’s later account of his investigation is that, on April 25, 2005, the day after judgment was delivered, he telephoned Mr Monteil, who was his personal friend. He says he called to inquire whether Clico had attempted to influence the Chief Magistrate during the trial of this matter, because in his view, the land transaction looked suspicious.

   Those suspicions seem to have been allayed by Mr Monteil’s assurance that it was a bona fide transaction, because “the man really wanted to buy the land.” He told Clico to “clean up their mess,” and says he used the word “mess” because “although I could not prove anything, I was angry, nevertheless.”
   

3. He says further, he was concerned that if the transaction was bona fide, the Chief Magistrate should not suffer from being over-cautious in returning the cheque. He had several subsequent phone calls and meetings with Mr Monteil.

   His primary concern was that he could not be accused of a dereliction of duty in failing to investigate the matter, even though he considered it to be a matter with no “smoking gun” [my emphasis]. On one occasion, Mr Monteil said the issue had been sorted out. No details of the nature of the investigation that was carried out have been supplied.
   

4. The fair-minded observer might take the view that it was unwise for the Attorney General to have become personally involved, instead of leaving the investigation to someone in the Corruption Investigation Bureau. The delicate circumstances that prevailed required him to maintain a conspicuous detachment, particularly since information was being sought from his personal friend, Mr Monteil.
   

5. The timing of the Attorney General’s intervention is also the subject of a discrepancy that may be of significance to the fair-minded observer. According to Mr Monteil, his first conversation with the Attorney General concerning this matter was sometime in late March or early April, at a time when judgment was still outstanding.

   We are not required at this stage to resolve that discrepancy. What we are required to consider is what impression the totality of the available evidence would have on a fair-minded observer.
   

6. In the light of the sensitivity of the case, the fair-minded and informed observer would be concerned that the deliberations between the Chief Magistrate and the Attorney General were not at arm’s length.

   Applying reasonable standards of propriety, but not being unduly suspicious, he would appreciate that several matters were discussed that may have had a bearing on the case, and that the Attorney General in his press release chose to be vague about them.
   

7. The matter went further. According to the Attorney General, it was only after the decision was handed down that the Attorney General concluded that there was no further cause for action at that time.

The weight of existing authority speaks to unconscious bias.

The fair-minded and informed observer would be aware that the Chief Magistrate gave his decision before the Attorney General came to a decision that there was no further cause for action. It would be too simplistic to say the observer’s fears would be allayed because of the presumption of impartiality. 

by Anand Ramlogan 2007-09-30

Site Admin Note: See also 'Cross Examination Jitters' by Trini.t.o.o